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Abstract
Using a threshold autoregressive model, we con￿rm the presence of nonlinearities
in sectoral real exchange rate (SRER) dynamics across Mexico, Canada and the US
in the pre-NAFTA and post-NAFTA periods. Measuring transaction costs using the
estimated threshold bands, we ￿nd evidence that Mexico still faces higher transaction
costs than their developed counterparts. Trade liberalization is associated with re-
duced transaction costs and lower relative price di⁄erentials among countries. Other
determinants of transaction costs are distance and nominal exchange rate volatility.
Our results show that the half-lives of SRERs shocks, calculated by Monte Carlo inte-
gration, imply much faster adjustment in the post-NAFTA period.
Keywords: NAFTA, Law of One Price, Exchange Rates, Nonlinearities, SETAR
JEL Classi￿cation: F31; F36; F41.
￿Acknowledgments: We thank the sta⁄of the Banco de Mexico for their helpful comments, Steven Phillips
for his contributions at various stages of preparation of this paper, and Roberto Benelli, Roberto Garcia-
Saltos, David J. Robinson, Lucio Sarno, and seminar participants at the IMF and at the LACEA 2007
conference for comments. This paper presents the authors￿personal opinion and does not necessarily re￿ ect
those of the International Monetary Fund, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, or the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System.
yCorresponding-author: Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, P.O. Box 442, St. Louis,
MO 63166-0442. Email: luciana.juvenal@stls.frb.org
11 Introduction
The analysis of relative price di⁄erentials across countries and sectors o⁄ers a way to eval-
uate the degree of market integration. The law of one price (LOOP) states that identical
goods should sell for the same price across countries when prices are expressed in a common
currency. Evidence has shown, however, that prices of goods fail to fully equalize between
countries, indicating that markets are not perfectly integrated.
Prices of homogeneous goods tend to di⁄er across countries because the presence of
transaction costs limits price arbitrage. Obstacles to integration include transport costs and
(explicit or implicit) trade barriers.
The study of the LOOP among NAFTA members is of particular interest, allowing an
assessment of whether regional trade liberalization has resulted in faster price convergence
and smaller price di⁄erentials across countries and greater market integration.
This paper concentrates on three issues. First, we assess the degree of market integration
among the US, Mexico and Canada by analyzing the validity of the LOOP between these
country pairs. Second, we determine whether markets became more integrated, with reduced
transaction costs, after the introduction of NAFTA. Finally, we analyze whether transaction
costs are related to economic determinants.
Our study focuses on the role of transaction costs in modeling deviations from the LOOP.
Several theoretical studies (see Dumas, 1992; Sercu et al., 1995; O￿ Connell, 1998) show that
because of transaction costs, it may not be pro￿table to arbitrage away relative price di⁄er-
ences across countries when the marginal costs of arbitrage exceed the marginal bene￿t. This
will generate a band of no trade where prices in two locations will fail to equalize. Outside
this threshold band, arbitrage is pro￿table and the sectoral real exchange rate (SRER) can
become mean-reverting. This dynamic implies nonlinearities in SRERs and is well captured
by using a threshold autoregressive (TAR) model for each sectoral relative price (see Tong,
1990; and Hansen, 1996, 1997). The TAR model allows for deviations from the LOOP to
exhibit unit root behavior inside the threshold band and to become mean-reverting outside
the band. If there is no mean reversion in the outer regime, relative prices fail to equalize
between countries, a sign of weak market integration. In this way, the estimated threshold
bands provide a measure of transaction costs.
The empirical methodology analyzes dynamics in relative price adjustment and innovates
2by taking the perspective of an emerging market ￿Mexico.1 Motivated by previous literature
we investigate the presence of threshold-type nonlinearities in deviations from the LOOP us-
ing monthly real dollar sectoral exchange rates vis-￿-vis the Mexican peso and the Canadian
dollar and monthly real exchange rates for Mexico vis-￿-vis Canada for 18 sectors. The
period considered is 1980-2006. Nonlinearities are captured using a self-exciting threshold
autoregressive model (SETAR).
More precisely, we estimate SETAR models for each SRER for the pre-NAFTA and post-
NAFTA periods. The outcome of this estimation contains a measure of transaction costs
(threshold band) and the autoregressive parameter outside the band. We determine whether
deviations from the LOOP show mean-reverting properties by testing whether the nonlinear
speci￿cation is superior to a nonstationary model for each subsample. This requires testing
whether the autoregressive process outside the band is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from the random
walk observed inside the band. We also test whether the threshold bands are signi￿cantly
wider for each SRER in the pre-NAFTA and post-NAFTA periods, thus allowing assessment
of whether NAFTA led to higher market integration.
The results show that transaction costs are larger for the Mexico-US and Mexico-Canada
country pairs than for the Canada-US pair, thus suggesting a higher degree of market in-
tegration between the US and Canada. We also ￿nd that NAFTA signi￿cantly reduced
transaction costs and price di⁄erentials between the US and Mexico, although this was not
uniform across sectors. Finally, our estimated transaction costs are negatively related to
trade liberalization, commonly shared geographic borders, and lower exchange rate volatil-
ity.
As a measure of the speed of mean reversion we compute the half-life, which is the time
it takes for the e⁄ects of half of a shock to dissipate, using generalized impulse response
functions (see Koop et al., 1996). We ￿nd that half-lives are substantially reduced after the
introduction of the NAFTA, especially for the Mexico-US country pair. This implies that
reduced arbitrage costs were accompanied by faster adjustments in price di⁄erentials.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews theoretical con-
siderations on nonlinear dynamics in SRERs and presents the corresponding econometric
methodology. The results are discussed in Section 3. We present a battery of robustness
tests in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
1There is now an established literature on nonlinear behavior of sectoral real exchange rates for developed
markets (see Obstfeld and Taylor, 1997; Imbs et al., 2003; Sarno et al., 2004 and Juvenal and Taylor, 2008).
32 Nonlinearities: Motivation and Empirical Framework
According to the LOOP, there should be no price di⁄erentials across countries for similar
goods when prices are expressed in a common currency. At the aggregate level, the LOOP
translates into purchasing power parity (PPP). The LOOP is based on the assumption of fric-
tionless goods arbitrage. This means that there are no impediments to trade or transaction
costs that would prevent perfect arbitrage.
Ample empirical evidence (Isard, 1977; Richardson, 1978 and Giovannini, 1988) suggests
that relative prices do not converge, or only in a very long-term horizon, and that price
di⁄erentials are persistent. These studies also found that relative price di⁄erentials are
signi￿cant and highly correlated with exchange rate movements.
One reason that prices of homogeneous commodities may not be the same across di⁄er-
ent countries is the existence of transaction costs arising from transport costs, tari⁄s, and
nontari⁄ barriers.2A number of theoretical papers suggest the importance of transport and
trade barriers in creating price di⁄erences between countries (e.g. Dumas, 1992; Sercu et al.,
1995; O￿ Connell, 1998). The models described in such studies have incorporated di⁄erent
assumptions regarding the nature of trade costs. Overall, price di⁄erences driven by trans-
action costs can be expressed as SiP i
j = P R
j + Aj, where Si is the nominal exchange rate
between country i￿ s currency and the reference country, P i
j is the price of good j in country
i, P R
j is the price of good j in the reference country, and Aj is the marginal transaction cost.
In particular, Aj shows the minimum price di⁄erence that makes arbitrage pro￿table be-
tween country i and the reference country. In the presence of perfectly competitive markets,
constant returns to scale technology, and absence of sellers pricing power, price di⁄erences






j ￿ Aj. (1)
In this framework, transaction costs generate two regimes: (i) when price di⁄erentials
are smaller than transaction costs, there is a regime of no arbitrage described by (1); (ii)
when price di⁄erences exceed transaction costs, arbitrage is pro￿table and equation (1) does
not hold. This implies that price di⁄erentials behave in a nonlinear fashion. Within the
2Heckscher (1916) ￿rst pointed out at the possibility of nonlinearities in relative prices in the presence
of trade frictions. In the case of Mexico, GonzÆlez and Rivadeneyra (2004) investigate the LOOP between
Mexican cities and provide empirical evidence that transactions costs (including tari⁄and non-tari⁄barriers)
explain departures from the LOOP.
4transaction costs band (or threshold band) price di⁄erentials follow a nonstationary process,
and outside the band they are mean reverting toward the band because of the e⁄ects of
arbitrage.




















is the SRER between country i￿ s currency and the reference country for good j.
The condition in (2) implies that the transaction costs band and nonlinearities are good and
country speci￿c.
Based on the previous theoretical framework, a number of empirical studies analyze the
nonlinear nature of deviations from the LOOP in terms of a TAR model (Tong, 1990).
The TAR model allows for the presence of a threshold band within which arbitrage is not
pro￿table. Consequently deviations from the LOOP follow a unit root process. Outside the
band the process can become mean-reverting.
Recent contributions that use this model to analyze SRER dynamics of developed markets
include Obstfeld and Taylor (1997), Sarno et al. (2004), Imbs et al. (2003), and Juvenal
and Taylor (2008). In particular, Obstfeld and Taylor (1997) ￿nd evidence of nonlinearities
in a sample of 32 locations, using disaggregated data on clothing, food, and fuel. Sarno et
al. (2004) provide support for nonlinear mean reversion with considerable cross-country and
sectoral heterogeneity. They use annual price data interpolated into quarterly data for nine
sectors and quarterly data on ￿ve exchange rates vis-￿-vis the US dollar. Juvenal and Taylor
(2008) study the presence of nonlinearities in deviations from the LOOP for 19 sectors in 10
European countries and ￿nd signi￿cant evidence of threshold adjustment with transaction
costs varying considerable across sectors and countries.
2.1 Empirical framework
2.1.1 Data
We use disaggregated monthly data on consumer price indices (CPIs) for 18 sectors from Jan-
uary 1980 to December 2006 for Mexico, the US and Canada. Data on CPIs were obtained
from the Bank of Mexico, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Statistics Canada. The sec-
tors analyzed are: bread (bread), meat (meat), ￿sh (￿sh), dairy (dairy), fruits (fruits), veg-
5etables (veg), nonalcoholic beverages (nonalco), alcoholic beverages (alco), tobacco (tobac),
women￿ s clothing (clothw), men￿ s clothing (clothm), footwear (foot), fuel (fuel), furniture
(furniture), medication (medic), vehicles (vehicles), gasoline (gasoline), and photographic
equipment (photo). Table 1 lists the sectors analyzed in this study and the description of
the category for each country. Monthly nominal exchange rates are period averages from the
International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
2.1.2 Model
To analyze patterns in relative price convergence, we model deviations from the LOOP
using a SETAR model for each sectoral exchange rate. More precisely, we investigate the
presence of nonlinearities in deviations from the LOOP using a threshold-type model with
two regimes.
In what follows, we proceed in four steps. First, we estimate TAR models for each
SRER. Second, we explore the validity of the nonlinear threshold model with respect to a
null hypothesis of unit root process. This allows us to test for the existence of some degree of
price convergence as opposed to no price convergence at all.3 Third, when we ￿nd evidence
that a nonlinear speci￿cation is superior to a nonstationary model, we determine whether
price convergence is characterized by an asymmetric threshold adjustment consistent with
arbitrage arguments. That is, we test whether a nonlinear model ￿ts the data better than a
stationary linear one. Finally, when we ￿nd evidence of nonlinear price convergence in the
pre-NAFTA and post-NAFTA periods, we test if the size of the threshold band is equal in
both periods.
The existence of transaction costs, in the form of transport costs or trade barriers, is one
explanation for lack of price convergence. As described before, frictions to trade imply the
presence of signi￿cant nonlinearities in SRER dynamics. That is, transaction costs generate a
band in which the marginal costs of arbitrage exceed the marginal bene￿t. Within this band,
there is a zone of no trade and consequently prices in two locations fail to equalize. Outside
3A failure to reject the unit root hypothesis implies that deviations from the LOOP are a uniform unit root
process and thus, prices in two locations are disconnected. This test allows identi￿cation of any di⁄erence in
the autoregressive parameters between the inner band and the outer band regimes. This test is an important
addition to the methodology generaly used in the literature. Earlier studies directly test for nonlinearity
with respect to a linear model but do not determine whether the outer regime is nonstationary. An exception
is found in Peel and Taylor (2002), who present a procedure to test for unit root to study covered interest
parity. We use the procedure developed by Enders and Granger (1998) to test for the null hypothesis of
nonstationarity against an alternative of stationarity with threshold adjustment.
6this band, arbitrage is pro￿table and the SRER can become mean-reverting. Empirically,
this pattern is described by a TAR model, which was originally popularized by Balke and
Fomby (1997) in the context of testing for PPP and the LOOP.
Let xi












t is the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate between country i0s currency and the
reference country, pi
jt is the logarithm of the price of good j in country i at time t, and pR
jt
is the logarithm of the price of good j in the reference country at time t.
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jt is the demeaned component of the relative price di⁄erence xi





jt is estimated as an OLS residual), ￿ is the threshold parameter4, and qi
jt￿d is the threshold
variable for sector j and country i. The parameter d accounts for the delay with which
economic agents react to real exchange rate deviations.
In what follows, we restrict the value of ￿ to unity, so inside the band deviations from
the LOOP are persistent and follow a random walk.5 Outside the band, when
￿ ￿qi
jt￿d
￿ ￿ > ￿,
the process becomes mean-reverting as long as ￿ < 1: The model described is a TAR (1,
2, d), where 1 is the autoregressive order, 2 represents the number of thresholds, and d is
the delay parameter. Further, because the threshold variable is assumed to be the lagged
dependent variable, the model is called SETAR (1, 2, d) with the given parameters.
An example of the estimated model is presented in Figure 1. The graph contains the
time series for qi
jt (solid line), which represents the demeaned real exchange rate between
Mexico and the US for the footwear sector and the estimated ￿ (dashed lines).
4Note that ￿ is country and sector speci￿c.
5This restriction is widely used in the literature (see Obstfeld and Taylor, 1997; Imbs et al., 2003; Sarno
et al., 2004; and Juvenal and Taylor, 2008).
7Figure 1. Footwear real exchange rate and threshold bands
2.1.3 Estimation










, which take the value of 1 when


































Note that the model in (8) is assumed to be symmetric. Thus, deviations from the LOOP
outside the threshold band are the same regardless of whether prices are higher in the US
or in another country. This speci￿cation assumes that reversion is toward the edge of the
band.










jt(￿;d)0 is a (1￿2) row vector that describes the behavior of ￿qi
jt in the outer regime
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￿
. (11)
The parameters of interest are ￿, ￿, and d. Equation (8) is a regression equation nonlinear
in parameters which can be estimated using least squares. For a given value of ￿ and d, the




































Because the values of ￿ and d are not given, they should be estimated together with the
autoregressive parameter ￿. Hansen (1997) suggests a methodology to identify the model in
equation (9) that consists of the simultaneous estimation of ￿, d, and ￿ via a grid search
over ￿ and d. The model is estimated by sequential least squares for values of d from 1 to 6.
The values of ￿ and d that minimize the sum of squared residuals are chosen. The range for
the grid search is selected to contain the 15th and 85th percentile of the threshold variable.
This can be written as
￿






where ￿ = [￿;￿]:
9The least-squares estimator of ￿ is b ￿ = b ￿
￿
b ￿; b d
￿
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and residual variance b ￿
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Before explaining the results, it is important to test if the TAR-type nonlinear model is
superior when tested against a unit root process and against a linear AR(1) process. These
tests require pre-estimation of both the linear model under the null hypothesis and the TAR
model under the alternative.
First, we test if the SETAR speci￿cation is superior to a unit root process for each
SRER employing the Enders and Granger (1998) threshold unit root test.6 The method is
a generalization of the Dickey-Fuller test. The null hypothesis is
H
A
0 : ￿ = 1
against an alternative of stationarity with threshold adjustment. This test allows identi￿ca-
tion of any di⁄erence in the autoregressive parameters between the inner and outer regimes.
Its main advantage is that it is generally more powerful than the Dickey-Fuller test. A failure
to reject the unit root null implies that the LOOP does not hold and prices in two locations
are disconnected. We interpret this as conveying that transaction costs are so high that the
entire series are included within the threshold bands. Thus, the inner and outer regimes
cannot be distinguished.
When the null hypothesis of unit root is rejected, we continue with our analysis. Our
second step is to test a linear AR(1) speci￿cation against a nonlinear stationary SETAR.




0 : ￿ = ￿.
6Other tests for the null of unit root against a nonlinear model have been proposed in the literature.
Recent contributions include Kapetanios and Shin (2006) and Bec et al. (2008). In particular, Kapetanios
and Shin (2006) propose a Wald statistic to test a unit root null against a three-regime SETAR process.
Bec et al. (2008) develop a more general procedure that consists of an adaptive threshold SupWald unit
root test. We emphasize that the decision to use the Enders and Granger (1998) test does not represent a
criticism of other methods. Overall, simulations have not provided evidence in favor of one test or another
and this analysis is beyond the scope of our paper.
10In cases in which we ￿nd evidence of nonlinearities in the pre-NAFTA and post-NAFTA
periods, we test if the size of the threshold band is equal in both periods. Let ￿i
j be the
name assigned to the threshold variable in the post-NAFTA period and ￿
i
j be the threshold








As noted in Hansen (1997), testing hypotheses HB
0 and HC
0 is not straightforward. A
statistical problem is present because conventional tests have asymptotic nonstandard dis-
tributions. To overcome inference problems, the asymptotic distribution of the conventional
F-statistic must be calculated using Monte Carlo simulation. Following Hansen (1997) and
Peel and Taylor (2002), if the errors are iid the null hypothesis HB
0 and HC











where FT is the F-statistic when ￿ and d are known, T is the sample size, and b ￿
2(￿;d) and
e ￿
2 are the unrestricted and restricted estimates of the residual variance. Hence, b ￿
2(￿;d) is
obtained from the unconstrained nonlinear least-squares estimation of equation (8) and e ￿
2
results from the estimation of equation (8) with the restriction to be tested imposed.
Because ￿ and d are not identi￿ed under the null hypothesis, the distribution of FT(￿;d)
is not ￿2. Hansen (1997) shows that the asymptotic distribution of FT(￿;d) may be ap-
proximated using the following bootstrap procedure: (i) generate yi￿
jt;t = 1;:::;T from iid
N(0;1) random draws; (ii) set qi￿
jt = yi￿
jt; (iii) using qi
jt￿1for t = 1;:::;T, regress yi￿
jt on qi
jt￿1
and estimate the restricted and unrestricted models and obtain the residual variances e ￿
￿2
and b ￿













The bootstrap approximation to the asymptotic p-value of the test is calculated by count-
ing the number of bootstrap samples for which F ￿
T(￿;d) exceeds the observed FT(￿;d).
113 Estimation Results
3.1 Testing for nonlinearity
Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C report the results of the estimation of the SETAR model for the
Mexico-US, Canada-US and Mexico-Canada country pairs, respectively. The ￿rst step con-
sists of testing the null hypothesis of a unit root using the Enders and Granger (1998)
threshold unit root test. Essentially, this allows us to determine whether the autoregressive
process is the same outside and inside the threshold band. A failure to reject the null hy-
pothesis implies that the SRER is nonstationary and consequently prices in two locations
are disconnected. Thus, the LOOP does not hold. Our interpretation of such a case is that
transaction costs are so large that arbitrage is not pro￿table and the threshold band is wide
enough to contain the entire time series of the SRER.
For the Mexico-US country pair, the test rejects the unit root null hypothesis in half of the
series for the pre-NAFTA period. By contrast, in the post-NAFTA period nonstationarity
is found in four of the sectors. We interpret these results as evidence that NAFTA has been
associated with greater integration between the US and Mexico.
The behavior of relative prices between Mexico and Canada shows a similar pattern even
though the degree of market integration has not improved as much in the post-NAFTA
period as in the case of the US and Mexico.
The deviations from the LOOP in the Canada-US country pair show a di⁄erent behavior.
The unit root null is rejected in 73 percent of the series in the pre-NAFTA period and in all
the series except one in the post-NAFTA period. These results suggest that the Canadian
and American markets have been more closely integrated, with a slight improvement with
NAFTA.
To further test for the validity of the SETAR model, the second step consists of testing
whether the nonlinear model is superior to a linear AR(1) process applying the Hansen test
described in the previous section. We conduct this test only for cases in which the Enders
and Granger (1998) test rejects the unit root null.7 Our results show that the outcomes of
the Hansen test are in line with the results of the Enders and Granger (1998) test. In the
cases in which the Enders and Granger (1998) test ￿nds evidence of threshold behavior, the
Hansen test rejects the linear null hypothesis.
7The Hansen test requires that the series are stationary; this is why we apply this test only for the series
in which the unit root null is rejected.
12At a sectoral level a few points should be highlighted. For the Mexico-US country pair,
there is evidence of unit root in bread, which is a low-cost subsidized food sector; in sectors
that are subject to intervention through taxation, such as alcoholic and nonalcoholic bever-
ages; and in a sector with a high degree of di⁄erentiation such as furniture. Interestingly,
nonstationary behavior is found in sectors such as gasoline and fuel, which are characterized
by a high degree of monopolistic power. Similarly, for the Mexico-Canada country pair there
is evidence of unit root in gasoline and bread, further suggesting the potential role of speci￿c
regulations in leading to price di⁄erences.
In the Canada-US country pair, nonstationary behavior is present in a sector subject
to government intervention such as tobacco and in clothing and footwear. By contrast,
threshold adjustment is signi￿cant in food products sectors except for bread.
3.2 Estimated Transaction costs
Tables 2A, 2B and 2C report the estimated threshold bands for each SRER for the three
country pairs. These bands are interpreted as a measure of transaction costs and thus re￿ ect
the degree of market integration.
Evidence of a strong NAFTA e⁄ect is found for the US-Mexico SRERs. Transaction
costs bands and the heterogeneity of the threshold values are signi￿cantly reduced after the
introduction of the NAFTA. In the pre-NAFTA period, they range from 7 percent (footwear)
to 32 percent (tobacco). By contrast, in the post-NAFTA period, threshold values range
from 2 percent (￿sh products) to 20 percent (medical commodities). At an individual level,
in sectors such as nonalcoholic beverages, clothing, furniture and medication, transaction
costs go from ￿very large￿(unit root process) in the pre-NAFTA period to measurable with
a threshold model in the post-NAFTA period. In sectors that exhibit signi￿cant nonlinear
behavior in both periods, threshold bands are signi￿cantly smaller in the post-NAFTA period
for meat, dairy, vegetables, tobacco, female clothing and photo equipment. The reduction
in the transaction costs bands suggests a greater market integration.
Considering those sectors in which nonlinearities are detected, average transaction costs
in the US-Mexico pair are smaller than those for the Mexico-Canada pair. Moreover, for the
latter, evidence of unit root behavior is found for a high proportion of sectors. This means
that transaction costs are so high that they are not worth arbitraging.
Transaction costs between the US and Canada are the lowest among the three country
13pairs examined. Overall, average transaction costs among NAFTA members are 34 percent
higher between the US and Mexico than between the US and Canada. This result con￿rms
previous evidence that the US and Canada are the most integrated among NAFTA members.8
We also ￿nd less dispersion in the threshold bands in the pre- and post-NAFTA periods.
The fact that the integration between Canada and the US started before the introduction of
NAFTA could explain this result.
A further look at sectoral characteristics con￿rms that highly homogenous sectors such as
￿sh and fruits show relatively low threshold bands. This is a standard result in the literature,
reported in studies for other country pairs (see Juvenal and Taylor, 2008). Compared with
the work of Juvenal and Taylor (2008), threshold bands among NAFTA members are on
average slightly lower than those between the United States and European countries.
3.3 Half-Lives of Relative Price Adjustment
A usual measure of the speed of mean reversion is the half-life, which is the time it takes for
the e⁄ect of 50 percent of a shock to die out. Tables 3A, 3B, and 3C report the estimated
half-lives (in terms of months) of price deviations from the LOOP, for the Mexico-US, the
Canada-U.S. and the Mexico-Canada SRERs.9
The speed of mean reversion is generally computed taking into account the adjustment
in the outer regime, which depends on the value of ￿. In this case, the half-life is calculated
as if it were a linear model, that is, ln(0.5)/ln(￿). Lo and Zivot (2001) emphasize that
the uncertainty of whether the computation of half-lives for linear models is applicable for
nonlinear models. However, all studies based on a SETAR model generally use this measure
(see, for example, Taylor, 2001). As highlighted in Juvenal and Taylor (2008), although the
estimated half-lives of the outer regime yield some insights on the speed of mean reversion,
this measure is limited because it does not consider the regime switching within the SETAR
model.
8One possible alternative explanation for ￿nding that thresholds are lower between the US and Canada
than between Mexico and the US may be that goods are more homogenous between the ￿rst two countries.
More generally, the comparability of the sectors may vary across country pairs. First, wealth e⁄ects may be
at play. The relatively large income di⁄erences between Mexico and the US and Canada a⁄ects the speci￿c
goods sampled in each CPI category. This disparity may complicate the analysis with the composition
between luxury, middle, and ordinary products varying across countries. Second, statistical di⁄erences exist
in the compilation of price-level data, notably in adjustments for quality changes. A solution to this problem
is to look at more disaggregated price indices and SRERs.
9We compute the half-lives only for cases in which we ￿nd evidence of threshold behavior.
14Thus, we compute the half-life using generalized impulse response functions proposed
by Koop et al. (1996). This method considers the nonlinear nature of the SETAR model
and the di⁄erent speeds of adjustment in the inner and outer regimes. The SETAR model
exhibits an in￿nite half-life within the threshold band and depends on ￿ outside the band.
A shock may cause the model to switch regimes, and this adjustment is not captured by the
￿rst methodology.
Following Taylor et al. (2001), we compute the impulse response functions conditional
on average initial history using Monte Carlo integration for shocks of 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50
percent.10
For the Mexico-US pair, the average relative price adjustment is signi￿cantly faster in the
post-NAFTA period. For example, for a 10 percent shock, the average pre-NAFTA half-life
is 20 months, whereas the average is reduced to 11 months in the post-NAFTA period. Our
results also yield additional observations. In the post-NAFTA period, there is less variation
in the speed of mean reversion across di⁄erent shock sizes than in the pre-NAFTA period.
This suggests that relative prices adjust more quickly, independently of the size of the price
shock. Half-lives vary substantially across sectors. Relative prices adjust relatively quickly
for homogeneous goods, such as food products. The relative price of the more high-end
products (e.g. furniture, and photographic equipment) takes longer to adjust.
The speed of relative price adjustment in the post-NAFTA period is comparable for the
Mexico-US and the Canada-US pairs. For a 10 percent shock, the average half-lives are 11
months and 12 months, respectively. This contrasts with signi￿cant di⁄erences in the pre-
NAFTA period when Mexico-U.S. relative prices were much slower to adjust than Canada-
U.S. prices. The half-lives of the Mexico-Canada country pairs are also less persistent in the
post-NAFTA period.
3.4 Determinants of Thresholds
Based on the estimates of the SETAR models, we determine whether transaction costs are
related to economic variables. To do this, we estimate a regression explaining the threshold
parameter obtained in section 3.2.
10For a complete explanation of generalized impulse responses, see Koop et al. (1996). A method similar
to the one used here but applied to an ESTAR model is presented and discussed in detail in Taylor et
al. (2001). Clarida and Taylor (2003) show how these methods may be applied to permanent-temporary













where ￿ is the threshold parameter and zi
j is a vector of explanatory variables. In equation
(17) we assess whether transaction costs, measured by the estimated thresholds, are explained
by selected explanatory variables.
The explanatory variables are intended to capture the size and nature of transaction costs.
The ￿rst variable we include is related to distance, which is a proxy for shipping costs. Given
the small number of country pairs and their relative proximity, distance appears to be a poor
measure. Instead, we include a dummy variable that takes value 1 when countries share a
common border. The second variable is the volatility of the nominal exchange rate, which
intends to capture the uncertainty about the macroeconomic environment. It is measured as
the standard deviation of monthly exchange rate observations. Third, we include a measure
of ￿tradability,￿de￿ned as the sum of imports and exports to the total output in a sector
for a given country sourced from the UNIDO database. Fourth, we use the number of
establishments in each sector as a proxy for competition, or concentration, obtained from
the UNIDO database. Finally, a dummy for the post-NAFTA period is included.
We examine the determinants of thresholds for the entire sample, including all three
country pairs.11 12 The results, shown in Table 4, indicate that three variables are signi￿cant
to explain the size of the estimated thresholds: the post-NAFTA dummy, the border, and
nominal exchange rate volatility. These variables are signi￿cant in all speci￿cations. We ￿nd
that the thresholds are lower when countries share a border. Nominal exchange rate volatility
is also signi￿cant. This indicates that uncertainty about the macroeconomic environment
limits arbitrage. The post-NAFTA dummy is also highly signi￿cant; the negative coe¢ cient
indicates that the introduction of NAFTA is associated with lower transaction costs. Neither
the number of ￿rms in a sector nor the degree of ￿tradability￿in a sector are found to be
statistically signi￿cant (column 1 in Table 4).13 In column 2, these two variables are excluded
with little change in the results.
11Because we cannot obtain data on ￿rms and tradability disaggregated for clothing (women) and clothing
(men) but for only a generic clothing sector, we consider the average threshold value of clothing (women)
and clothing (men) as the b ￿ value for clothing.
12In cases in which we ￿nd evidence of unit root in deviations from the LOOP, we consider ￿ to be the
highest value of the threshold variable in the grid search. This implies that transaction costs are so high
that the entire SRER series is within the threshold band.
13The poor quality of the data is a probable explanation for the lack of signi￿cance.
16Overall, thresholds appear to be determined by distance (border) and exchange rate
volatility. These results are in line with ￿ndings in the literature. For example, Imbs et al.
(2003) ￿nd that distance, and exchange rate volatility explain the threshold values.
Another strand of the literature analyzed the determinants of relative price di⁄erentials
between the US and Canada using di⁄erent type of models. Our results are consistent with
the ￿ndings of these studies. As an example, Engel and Rogers (1996) study the nature of
deviations from the LOOP using CPI data for 14 goods sectors for di⁄erent US and Canadian
cities. This study shows that the Canadian and US markets are not perfectly integrated and
that distance and border are major determinants of price di⁄erences. In a related study,
Engel et al. (2005) investigate the LOOP between US and Canadian cities using actual
prices (instead of price indices). They ￿nd that absolute price di⁄erences between US and
Canadian prices are higher than 7 percent. In addition, their results show that distance and
border play a signi￿cant role in explaining price di⁄erentials between cities.
4 Robustness of Results
We conduct three robustness checks to gauge the sensitivity of empirical results to underlying
assumptions and variable de￿nitions. First, we consider the possibility of long-run trends in
the measured price di⁄erentials arising from aggregation issues in price indices or from the
presence of nontradable components or quality di⁄erences. We de￿ne qi
jt to be the detrended
and demeaned component of the price di⁄erence xi




previously, it is estimated as an OLS residual.
Overall, our baseline ￿ndings prove robust to using detrended SRER instead of the de-
meaned series. Tables 5A, 5B and 5C show the results of the estimation of the SETAR
model with detrended sectoral real exchange rates. The conceptual problem with including
a trend in the real exchange rate is that it implies that the real exchange rate converges
to a di⁄erent mean across time. This is somewhat contradictory to the LOOP. Hence, our
preferred measure is the demeaned series. The stability of our results with the di⁄erent
measures indicates that the trend component may not be of the utmost importance.
Second, we test the sensitivity of the results to a structural break in the Mexican series
over the study period (1980 ￿ 2006) during the Tequila crisis. The results reported in
the paper assume a constant mean over the period, consistent with the LOOP hypothesis.
However, as a robustness check, we also test the sensitivity of the results to (i) allowing
17for a di⁄erent mean over the Tequila crisis (1994:12 to 1995:12), and (ii) restricting the
estimation period to 1996￿ 2006. This was intended to assess whether the Tequila crisis
would signi￿cantly a⁄ect our ￿ndings. Our baseline ￿ndings are again robust to these checks.
Tables 6A, 6B and 6C report the estimated thresholds for each SRER, allowing for a di⁄erent
mean for the real exchange rate during the Tequila crisis. Across sectors, homogeneous
goods have lower transaction costs than other goods in the sample. Across country pairs,
average transaction costs among NAFTA members are 27 percent higher between the US
and Mexico than between the US and Canada, slightly less than in the results without taking
into account the Tequila crisis. The results of the latter robustness analysis (not reported
here but available upon request) are broadly consistent with the ones discussed here, which
re￿ ects that Tequila crisis does not signi￿cantly a⁄ect our ￿ndings.
5 Summary of Results and Conclusion
Using a SETAR model, we ￿nd strong evidence of nonlinearities in SRER dynamics across
Mexico, Canada, and the US in the pre-NAFTA and post-NAFTA periods. This result is
consistent with the predictions of theoretical models that incorporate some form of market
segmentation. Overall, mean reversion occurs when deviations from the LOOP are signi￿cant
and the bene￿ts to arbitrage are higher than transaction costs.
We obtain two key parameters from the estimation of SETAR models. The ￿rst parameter
is the threshold, which is a measure of transaction costs. The second parameter is the
autoregressive parameter in the outer regime, which determines the speed of mean reversion.
We obtain these parameters for each SRER corresponding to the three country pairs for
both periods.
Our ￿ndings indicate that the value of transaction costs is highly heterogeneous for
di⁄erent sectors and countries. The estimated price thresholds range from 2 percent to 32
percent for the Mexico-US and Canada-US country pairs. The results generally con￿rm that
highly homogeneous sectors, such as ￿sh and fruits, show low threshold bands. Overall,
average transaction costs among NAFTA members are 34 percent higher between the US
and Mexico than between the US and Canada. This indicates that Mexico and the US are
relatively less integrated than Canada and the US. In turn, threshold bands are higher for
the Mexico-Canada pair.
We relate the value of the threshold band to plausible economic determinants. Our
18results show that the border e⁄ect and exchange rate volatility are signi￿cant determinants
of transaction costs. The dummy post-NAFTA is also strongly signi￿cant and negative,
con￿rming that the introduction of NAFTA is associated with lower transaction costs.
To shed some light on the mean-reverting properties of the SRERs we consider the regime
switching that occurs within and outside the band in the SETAR model and compute the
half-lives using generalized impulse response functions. Overall, the speed of mean reversion
depends on the size of the shock: larger shocks mean-revert much faster than smaller ones.
On average, the half-lives were substantially reduced after the introduction of NAFTA. In
the Mexico-US country pair, the average half-life is reduced from 20 months in the pre-
NAFTA period to 11 months in the post-NAFTA period. The post-NAFTA period shows
less variation in the speed of mean reversion across di⁄erent shock sizes than in the pre-
NAFTA period.
Our analysis therefore supports the arguments that (i) emerging markets ￿ in this case,
Mexico￿still face higher transaction costs than their developed counterparts, and (ii) trade
liberalization may help in lowering relative price di⁄erentials between countries. We suspect
that lack of competition may be a major determinant of high price thresholds but cannot
prove this matter empirically.
The main conclusion of our analysis is that Mexico has made progress but still has consid-
erable room for improvement in reducing barriers to goods market integration and achieving
full bene￿ts of globalization. It would be important to further analyze why transactions
costs between Mexico and the US continue to exceed those between Canada and the US for
many types of goods, and to determine whether these costs can be reduced through policy
actions. Examples of such actions include developing logistics, transportation, and internal
distribution mechanisms or enhancing the state of competition among domestic ￿rms and
reducing remaining barriers to external trade.
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21Table 1. Categories of Goods in the CPIs
Sector Mexico US Canada
Bread Bread, tortillas, and cereals Cereals and bakery products Bakery and other cereal products
Meat Meat Meat Meat
Fish Fish and seafood Fish and seafood Fish and other seafood
Dairy Milk, dairy products, and eggs Dairy and related products Dairy products and eggs
Fruits Fresh fruits Fresh fruits Fruit, fruit preparation, and nuts
Veg Fresh vegetables Fresh vegetables Fresh vegetables
Nonalco Sugar, co⁄ee, and packaged refreshments Nonalcoholic beverages ￿
Alco Alcoholic beverages Alcoholic beverages Alcoholic beverages
Tobac Tobacco Tobacco Tobacco products and smokers￿supplies
Clothw Women￿ s clothing Women￿ s apparel Women￿ s wear
Clothm Men￿ s clothing Men￿ s apparel Men￿ s wear
Foot Footwear Footwear Footwear
Fuel Electricity and fuel Fuel and utilities Water, fuel and electricity
Furniture Furniture Furniture and bedding Furniture
Medic Medications and equipment Medical care commodities ￿
Vehicles Acquisition of vehicles New vehicles Purchase of automotive vehicles
Gasoline Gasoline and lubricants￿oil Gasoline (all types) Gasoline
Photo Photographic equipment and material Photographic equipment and supplies ￿
22Table 2A. SETAR Estimation Results: Mexico-US
Pre-NAFTA Post-NAFTA
Sector Threshold Outer regime Unit root test Hansen test Threshold Outer regime Unit root test Hansen test
￿ ￿ p-value HA
0 p-value HB




Bread ￿ ￿ 0.52 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.24 ￿ ￿
Meat 0.27 0.92 ￿ 0.00 0.09 0.96 ￿ 0.00 0.00
Fish ￿ ￿ 0.15 ￿ 0.02 0.96 ￿ 0.00 ￿
Dairy 0.28 0.85 ￿ ￿ 0.10 0.75 ￿ 0.00 0.00
Fruits ￿ ￿ 0.25 ￿ 0.05 0.84 ￿ 0.00 ￿
Veg 0.09 0.78 ￿ 0.00 0.15 0.70 ￿ 0.00 0.05
Nonalco ￿ ￿ 0.35 ￿ 0.15 0.81 ￿ 0.00 ￿
Alco 0.10 0.92 ￿ 0.00 ￿ ￿ 0.11 ￿ ￿
Tobac 0.32 0.73 ￿ 0.00 0.14 0.86 ￿ 0.00 0.00
Clothw 0.18 0.86 ￿ 0.00 0.09 0.83 ￿ 0.00 0.01
Clothm ￿ ￿ 0.13 ￿ 0.16 0.87 ￿ 0.00 ￿
Foot 0.07 0.95 ￿ 0.02 0.08 0.87 ￿ 0.00 0.64
Fuel ￿ ￿ 0.34 ￿ ￿ - 0.59 ￿ ￿
Furniture ￿ ￿ 0.28 ￿ 0.18 0.86 ￿ 0.01 ￿
Medic ￿ ￿ 0.14 ￿ 0.20 0.85 ￿ 0.00 ￿
Vehicles 0.14 0.75 ￿ 0.00 0.12 0.64 ￿ 0.00 0.39
Gasoline ￿ ￿ 0.23 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.11 ￿ ￿
Photo 0.19 0.97 ￿ 0.03 0.19 0.85 ￿ 0.00 0.00
Notes: This table shows the results from the estimation of the SETAR (1,2,d) model in equation (8). ￿ is the value of the threshold and ￿ is the
outer root of the TAR process. The estimation of ￿, ￿ and d is done simultaneously via a grid search over ￿ and d as described in Section 2. p-value HA
0 ,
p-value HB
0 and p-value HC
0 represent, respectively, the marginal signi￿cance levels of the null hypothesis of unit root in the outer regime, null hypothesis
of linearity, and null hypothesis of equality of thresholds during pre- and post-NAFTA periods.
23Table 2B. SETAR Estimation Results: Canada-US
Pre-NAFTA Post-NAFTA
Sector Threshold Outer regime Unit root test Hansen test Threshold Outer regime Unit root test Hansen test
￿ ￿ p-value HA
0 p-value HB




Bread ￿ ￿ 0.36 ￿ 0.09 0.93 ￿ 0.00 ￿
Meat 0.06 0.91 ￿ 0.00 0.04 0.94 ￿ 0.00 0.39
Fish 0.08 0.85 ￿ 0.00 0.04 0.90 ￿ 0.00 0.08
Dairy 0.07 0.91 ￿ 0.00 0.07 0.95 ￿ 0.00 ￿
Fruits 0.16 0.95 ￿ 0.02 0.09 0.79 ￿ 0.00 ￿
Veg 0.14 0.80 ￿ 0.00 0.05 0.79 ￿ 0.00 0.01
Alco 0.15 0.89 ￿ 0.00 0.14 0.93 ￿ 0.00 0.47
Tobac ￿ ￿ 0.14 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.41 ￿ ￿
Clothw 0.05 0.94 ￿ 0.00 0.13 0.81 ￿ 0.00 0.07
Clothm ￿ ￿ 0.23 ￿ 0.14 0.93 ￿ 0.00 ￿
Foot ￿ ￿ 0.18 ￿ 0.08 0.96 ￿ 0.00 ￿
Fuel 0.08 0.95 ￿ 0.00 0.04 0.94 ￿ 0.00 0.07
Furniture 0.16 0.91 ￿ 0.00 0.10 0.95 ￿ 0.00 0.02
Vehicles 0.08 0.92 ￿ 0.00 0.07 0.94 ￿ 0.00 0.54
Gasoline 0.27 0.79 ￿ 0.00 0.28 0.72 ￿ 0.00 0.46
Notes: See Table 2A.
24Table 2C. SETAR Estimation Results: Mexico-Canada
Pre-NAFTA Post-NAFTA
Sector Threshold Outer regime Unit root test Hansen test Threshold Outer regime Unit root test Hansen test
￿ ￿ p-value HA
0 p-value HB




Bread ￿ ￿ 0.34 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.53 ￿ ￿
Meat 0.24 0.90 ￿ 0.00 0.76 ￿ ￿ 0.00 0.03
Fish 0.14 0.87 ￿ 0.0 0.14 ￿ ￿ 0.01 ￿
Dairy 0.30 0.80 ￿ 0.00 0.19 ￿ ￿ 0.00 0.00
Fruits ￿ ￿ 0.17 ￿ 0.15 ￿ ￿ 0.00 ￿
Veg 0.15 0.71 ￿ 0.0 0.21 ￿ ￿ 0.00 0.07
Alco 0.23 0.92 ￿ 0.00 0.27 ￿ ￿ 0.00 0.58
Tobac ￿ ￿ 0.14 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.25 ￿ ￿
Clothw 0.15 0.8 ￿ 0.00 0.21 ￿ ￿ 0.00 0.14
Clothm 0.17 0.90 ￿ 0.00 0.20 ￿ ￿ 0.00 0.19
Foot 0.10 0.90 ￿ 0.00 0.20 ￿ ￿ 0.00 0.03
Fuel ￿ ￿ 0.27 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.61 ￿ ￿
Furniture ￿ ￿ 0.16 ￿ 0.22 ￿ ￿ 0.00 0.01
Vehicles ￿ ￿ 0.18 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.66 ￿ ￿
Gasoline ￿ ￿ 0.13 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.24 ￿ ￿
Notes: See Table 2.A.
25Table 3A. Half-Lives: Mexico-US
Pre-NAFTA Post-NAFTA
Sector Shock (%) Shock (%)
10 20 30 40 50 10 20 30 40 50
Bread ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Meat 36 26 20 17 15 29 25 23 22 21
Fish ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 19 18 18 18 18
Dairy 20 15 11 9 8 7 5 5 5 5
Fruits ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 6 5 5 5 5
Veg 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5
Nonalco ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 7 7 6 6 6
Alco 13 12 12 11 11 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Tobac 18 12 8 7 6 8 7 7 7 7
Clothw 10 10 10 9 9 5 5 5 5 5
Clothm ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 10 8 8 7 7
Foot 18 17 16 16 16 6 6 6 6 6
Fuel ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Furniture ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 14 10 8 8 8
Medic ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 8 8 8 8 7
Vehicles 6 5 5 4 3 6 4 4 4 4
Gasoline ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Photo 55 49 44 40 37 24 14 10 9 8
Average 20 17 14 13 12 11 9 8 8 8
Notes: This table shows the estimated half-lives of deviations from the LOOP for ￿ve sizes of percentage shock: 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50. The half-lives
were calculated conditional on average initial history using the generalized impulse response functions procedure developed by Koop et al. (1996).
26Table 3B. Half-Lives: Canada-US
Pre-NAFTA Post-NAFTA
Sector Shock (%) Shock (%)
10 20 30 40 50 10 20 30 40 50
Bread ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 14 12 12 11 11
Meat 11 10 10 10 9 13 12 12 12 12
Fish 6 5 4 4 4 9 8 8 8 8
Dairy 12 10 10 10 10 16 15 15 14 14
Fruits 27 24 21 20 19 5 5 5 5 5
Veg 7 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5
Alco 13 10 9 9 9 17 16 15 14 13
Tobac ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Clothw 14 13 12 12 11 7 7 6 6 6
Clothm ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 18 15 14 13 13
Foot ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 25 22 20 20 19
Fuel 17 15 15 15 15 12 12 12 12 11
Furniture 21 15 13 12 12 29 24 21 19 18
Vehicles 13 12 11 11 11 14 13 13 13 12
Gasoline 8 7 6 6 6 7 5 5 5 5
Average 14 12 11 10 10 12 11 11 10 10
Notes: See Table 3A.
27Table 3C. Half-Lives: Mexico-Canada
Pre-NAFTA Post-NAFTA
Sector Shock (%) Shock (%)
10 20 30 40 50 10 20 30 40 50
Bread ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Meat 24 17 13 12 11 7 6 6 6 6
Fish 10 8 7 7 6 16 14 12 12 12
Dairy 9 7 6 5 5 11 9 9 8 8
Fruits ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 5 4 4 4 4
Veg 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4
Alco 16 14 13 12 11 16 15 14 14 14
Tobac ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Clothw 10 10 9 8 8 11 10 9 8 8
Clothm 12 11 11 10 9 14 13 12 12 11
Foot 9 8 8 8 7 15 13 12 12 11
Fuel ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Furniture ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 8 6 6 5 5
Vehicles ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Gasoline ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Average 12 10 9 8 8 11 10 9 9 9
Notes: See Table 3A.

















Notes: This table shows the results from the estimation of equation (17). In parenthesis are the p ￿ values. *, ** and *** denote signi￿cance at the
10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.
29Table 5A. SETAR Estimation Results (Detrended Data): Mexico-US
Pre-NAFTA Post-NAFTA
Sector Threshold Outer regime Unit root test Hansen test Threshold Outer regime Unit root test Hansen test
￿ ￿ p-value HA
0 p-value HB
0 ￿ ￿ p-value HA
0 p-value HB
0
Bread ￿ ￿ 0.31 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.14 ￿
Meat 0.26 0.92 ￿ 0.00 0.03 0.94 ￿ 0.00
Fish ￿ ￿ 0.18 ￿ 0.03 0.95 ￿ 0.00
Dairy 0.29 0.84 ￿ ￿ 0.09 0.83 ￿ 0.00
Fruits ￿ - 0.13 ￿ 0.02 0.82 ￿ 0.00
Veg 0.06 0.77 ￿ 0.00 0.15 0.78 ￿ 0.00
Nonalco ￿ ￿ 0.16 ￿ 0.10 0.76 ￿ 0.00
Alco 0.22 0.79 ￿ 0.00 ￿ ￿ 0.17 ￿
Tobac ￿ ￿ 0.15 0.00 0.16 0.90 ￿ 0.00
Clothw 0.17 0.88 ￿ 0.00 0.18 0.80 ￿ 0.00
Clothm ￿ ￿ 0.33 ￿ 0.15 0.77 ￿ 0.00
Foot 0.11 0.93 ￿ 0.02 0.09 0.88 ￿ 0.00
Fuel ￿ ￿ 0.22 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.70 ￿
Furniture ￿ ￿ 0.46 ￿ 0.16 0.81 ￿ 0.01
Medic ￿ ￿ 0.27 ￿ 0.15 0.88 ￿ 0.00
Vehicles 0.16 0.79 ￿ 0.00 0.09 0.70 ￿ 0.00
Gasoline ￿ ￿ 0.19 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.17 ￿
Photo 0.16 0.96 ￿ 0.02 0.17 0.90 ￿ 0.00
Notes: See Table 2A.
30Table 5B. SETAR Estimation Results (Detrended Data): Canada-US
Pre-NAFTA Post-NAFTA
Sector Threshold Outer regime Unit root test Hansen test Threshold Outer regime Unit root test Hansen test
￿ ￿ p-value HA
0 p-value HB
0 ￿ ￿ p-value HA
0 p-value HB
0
Bread ￿ ￿ 0.40 ￿ 0.15 0.83 ￿ 0.00
Meat ￿ ￿ 0.23 ￿ 0.03 0.95 ￿ 0.00
Fish 0.11 0.85 ￿ 0.00 0.02 0.94 ￿ 0.00
Dairy 0.05 0.94 ￿ 0.00 0.07 0.92 ￿ 0.00
Fruits 0.11 0.88 ￿ 0.02 0.09 0.83 ￿ 0.00
Veg 0.04 0.72 ￿ 0.00 0.03 0.85 ￿ 0.00
Alco 0.08 0.91 ￿ 0.00 0.10 0.82 ￿ 0.00
Tobac ￿ ￿ 0.22 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.22 ￿
Clothw 0.04 0.90 ￿ 0.00 0.09 0.80 ￿ 0.00
Clothm 0.06 0.88 ￿ 0.00 0.11 0.94 ￿ 0.00
Foot ￿ ￿ 0.12 ￿ 0.05 0.90 ￿ 0.00
Fuel 0.05 0.90 ￿ 0.00 0.09 0.86 ￿ 0.00
Furniture 0.08 0.87 ￿ 0.00 0.16 0.91 ￿ 0.00
Vehicles 0.09 0.80 ￿ 0.00 0.10 0.95 ￿ 0.00
Gasoline 0.16 0.97 ￿ 0.00 0.05 0.80 ￿ 0.00
Notes: See Table 2A.
31Table 5C. SETAR Estimation Results (Detrended Data): Mexico-Canada
Pre-NAFTA Post-NAFTA
Sector Threshold Outer regime Unit root test Hansen test Threshold Outer regime Unit root test Hansen test
￿ ￿ p-value HA
0 p-value HB
0 ￿ ￿ p-value HA
0 p-value HB
0
Bread 0.28 0.82 ￿ 0.00 0.21 0.72 ￿ 0.00
Meat 0.22 0.92 ￿ 0.00 0.11 0.88 ￿ 0.00
Fish ￿ ￿ 0.13 ￿ 0.12 0.92 ￿ 0.00
Dairy 0.31 0.91 ￿ 0.00 0.20 0.87 ￿ 0.00
Fruits ￿ ￿ 0.11 ￿ 0.08 0.78 ￿ 0.00
Veg 0.08 0.75 ￿ 0.00 0.12 0.70 ￿ 0.00
Alco 0.22 0.83 ￿ 0.00 0.25 0.93 ￿ 0.01
Tobac ￿ ￿ 0.19 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.55 ￿
Clothw 0.24 0.94 ￿ 0.02 0.24 0.72 ￿ 0.00
Clothm 0.23 0.93 ￿ 0.01 0.24 0.82 ￿ 0.00
Foot 0.15 0.85 ￿ 0.00 0.20 0.92 ￿ 0.00
Fuel ￿ ￿ 0.35 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.31 ￿
Furniture ￿ ￿ 0.19 ￿ 0.18 0.86 ￿ 0.00
Vehicles ￿ ￿ 0.17 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.15 ￿
Gasoline ￿ ￿ 0.18 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.39 ￿
Notes: See Table 2A.
32Table 6A. SETAR Estimation Results (Di⁄erent Mean during Tequila Crisis): Mexico-US
Post-NAFTA
Sector Threshold Outer regime Unit root test Hansen test
￿ ￿ p-value HA
0 p-value HB
0
Bread ￿ ￿ 0.54 ￿
Meat 0.14 0.82 ￿ 0.00
Fish 0.13 0.91 ￿ 0.00
Dairy 0.07 0.71 ￿ 0.00
Fruits 0.05 0.77 ￿ 0.00
Veg 0.04 0.83 ￿ 0.00
Nonalco 0.14 0.78 ￿ 0.00
Alco 0.11 0.93 ￿ 0.00
Tobac 0.08 0.89 ￿ 0.00
Clothw 0.09 0.83 ￿ 0.00
Clothm 0.10 0.79 ￿ 0.00
Foot 0.08 0.94 ￿ 0.00
Fuel 0.14 0.75 ￿ 0.00
Furniture 0.11 0.90 ￿ 0.00
Medic 0.17 0.77 ￿ 0.00
Vehicles 0.12 0.83 ￿ 0.00
Gasoline ￿ ￿ 0.25 ￿
Photo 0.12 0.91 ￿ 0.00
Notes: See Table 2A.
33Table 6B. SETAR Estimation Results (Di⁄erent Mean during Tequila Crisis): Canada-US
Post-NAFTA
Sector Threshold Outer Regime Hansen Test
￿ ￿ p-value HB
0
Bread 0.09 0.93 0.00
Meat 0.04 0.94 0.00
Fish 0.04 0.90 0.00
Dairy 0.07 0.95 0.00
Fruits 0.09 0.79 0.00
Veg 0.05 0.79 0.00
Alco 0.14 0.93 0.00
Tobac 0.05 0.95 0.03
Clothw 0.13 0.81 0.00
Clothm 0.14 0.93 0.00
Foot 0.08 0.96 0.00
Fuel 0.04 0.94 0.00
Furniture 0.10 0.95 0.00
Vehicles 0.07 0.94 0.00
Gasoline 0.26 0.72 0.00
Notes: See Table 2A
34Table 6C. SETAR Estimation Results (Di⁄erent Mean during Tequila Crisis): Mexico-Canada
Post-NAFTA
Sector Threshold Outer Regime Unit Root Test Hansen Test
￿ ￿ p-value HA
0 p-value HB
0
Bread ￿ ￿ 0.74 ￿
Meat 0.20 0.92 ￿ 0.00
Fish 0.13 0.91 ￿ 0.00
Dairy 0.08 0.97 ￿ 0.05
Fruits 0.08 0.83 ￿ 0.00
Veg 0.04 0.80 ￿ 0.00
Alco 0.06 0.95 ￿ 0.02
Tobac ￿ ￿ 0.25 ￿
Clothing 0.10 0.90 ￿ 0.00
Clothm 0.11 0.89 ￿ 0.00
Foot 0.06 0.95 ￿ 0.02
Fuel 0.14 0.77 ￿ 0.01
Furniture ￿ ￿ 0.16 ￿
Vehicles ￿ ￿ 0.13 ￿
Gasoline ￿ ￿ 0.07 ￿
Notes: See Table 2A.
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